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Nietzsche on Reality as Will to Power: Toward an
“Organization–Struggle” Model
CIANO AYDIN
The goal of this article is to shed light on Nietzsche’s notion of reality througha critical examination of the notions “will to power,” “struggle,” and “organ-
ization.” In the first section, I discuss the ontological status of the will to power.
I then elaborate this notion on the basis of the (relation among the) concepts
“organization” (section 2), “form” (section 3), and struggle (section 4). Although
I discuss the concept of form in a separate section, I argue later that organiza-
tion and form are too interrelated to be conceived as distinct elements. In section
5, I test the “organization–struggle” model that I have developed by applying it
to the problem of decadence. I then conclude with a short discussion of the results
of this study and also of some problems it raises.
1. The Ontological Status of the Will to Power
From the beginning of the second half of the 1880s Nietzsche proclaimed explic-
itly that all reality is will to power: “The world viewed from inside, [. . .] it would
be simply ‘will to power’and nothing else—” (BGE36; cf. ZII: “Self-Overcoming”;
BGE 13). His homogenizing of reality as will to power implies that all reality has
the same character. Reality has only one intrinsic quality: the will to power. At the
same time, the will to power is the only principle of interpretation (Deutungsprinzip)
for reality.
Attributing to reality as few qualities as possible is, according to Nietzsche,
dictated by the principle of economy, the “morals of the method” itself: “The
hypothesis that explains the temporal world with the lowest expenditure of pre-
suppositions and means” has primacy (KSA 7:23[30]). Principles are unproven
maxims, that is, presuppositions accepted as foundations: axioms. The fewer
axioms, the better. As long as one causal or teleological principle is sufficient
to understand reality, one should not adopt more (see BGE 13, 36).
This does not preclude that the will to power could be understood as a teleo-
logical principle or as a substantial cause. Furthermore, one could think that the
homogenization of reality involves a negation of diversity and richness. In
addition, Nietzsche calls his notion of the will to power repeatedly a hypothesis.
How should we understand all this?
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We can begin with some elaboration of Nietzsche’s notion of “power.” “Power”
in “will to power” is a peculiar concept. It is characterized, and this is a crucial
point, by intrinsic relationality: power is only power in relation to another power.
Nietzsche says: “A power quantum is characterized by its effect and its resist-
ant” (KSA 13:14[79]; cf. KSA 12:2[159], 12:9[151]). The concept “power” would
be meaningless if a power were detached from an opposite power. That power is
inherently relational implies further that it is characterized by a relation without
relata that precede it or that can exist independent of it. Nietzsche’s principle of
the will to power implies that relation is not an additional element of things but,
rather, something that constitutes in a fundamental way what a thing is. In other
words, there are no first things, which then have relations with each other; rather,
things are what they are by virtue of their relations.
Furthermore, Nietzsche’s concept of power implies that reality is dynamic in
the strongest meaning of the word. Power, in Nietzsche’s view, entails a direct-
edness or causation without there being something (durable), a fixed cause, that
can be separated from that directedness or causation; power is in its essence
“something” that does not coincide with itself. It is an always-being-on-the-way.
Additionally, this structure implies that power must be understood as a neces-
sary striving for more power (see KSA 13:14[82]). Power is a necessary striving
to expand itself. Power is only power insofar as it can maintain itself against
other powers and strives to predominate over them.
There is in Nietzsche’s worldview nothing that has existence and meaning
outside the “game” of power relations. Because of this, there is no withdrawal
from this “game.” Even rejecting the claim that reality is will to power is an
expression of will to power. Also making a statement about the cause or (pre-
given) goal of a thing is nothing else than the formulation of a will to power,
which always can be questioned by other wills to power. Every account is under-
stood as a power seizure or as the effect of it. Although the necessary striving
for more power can be called teleological, it is not teleological in the traditional
Aristotelian sense. What we have here is, in a certain sense, a teleology without
telos. The crucial point is that the “teleological” character of the will to power
not only has no pre-given, fixed end but also precisely precludes such an end.
Such a pre-given end that is precluded, and that Nietzsche frequently attacks,
is self-preservation. Nietzsche characterizes the notion of self-preservation as one
of those “redundant teleological principles” (BGE 13). At the same time, this con-
ception is exposed as an attempt to negate the reality of becoming. The statement
that all life strives for self-preservation presupposes that there is a substantial self
that wants to preserve itself. Nietzsche repudiates that there is such a self.1
The notion of the will to power can be conceived as a kind of hypothesis. It is,
however, not the kind of hypothesis that can be proved to be a true and valid thesis
through sufficient verification or lack of falsification. Such is not possible because
all conditions that have to be fulfilled are themselves formulations of will to
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power.2 In the game of power relations every power tries to impose its own
conditions on the rest. Aproposition never loses its conditional character, because
it is continuously being questioned by other powers. There is no proposition that
can ever be determined definitively as being true. The hypothetical character of
the notion of the will to power expresses this provisional status, this “always-
being-at-risk,” of every proposition.
Every actualization is for Nietzsche the realization of only one possibility.
There is what he sometimes calls a permanent chaos at work, which is a condi-
tion for discovering ever more and alternative possibilities. The chaos is, there-
fore, not a mere burden that we have to overcome to survive or make our life
easier; that is only one aspect of it. It plays also a very positive role. It is the
basis for all creation and creativity. Without it nothing novel could emerge. The
more that chaos breaks into our ordered world, the more our creative power is
stimulated (see KSA 8:5[188], 10:5[1]). In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche
puts it in the following poetic formulation: “I say to you: one must still have
chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say to you: you still
have chaos in yourself” (Z “P” 5; KSA 4, 19, 9:11[121], 10:24[5]). Nietzsche
believes that this element is operative in every aspect of reality, even on a cos-
mological level. Not only is there no final ground or divine order to which ulti-
mately everything can be reduced, but also there can be no phase in which there
is no chaos anymore. In his early writings on cosmology, Nietzsche repudiates
Anaxagoras’s view that chaos was a phase that preceded the cosmos and that
there is a movement toward ever more order and ever less chaos and chance
(KSA 9:11[157]). For Nietzsche chaos and chance are, in a certain sense, eter-
nal, meaning that “underlying” every order there is an element of chaos that is
operative: we never can reach a final ground or ultimate end but, in fact, are
always confronted with a multiplicity of possibilities.3
The principle of the will to power proves to be a special kind of “principle,”
one that deprives every principle that serves as the basis of our interpretation of
reality of its unconditional character. The homogenizing of reality in this way
does not lead to the negation of the diversity and richness of the world. On the
contrary, because of it, every determination of reality, every interpretation, is con-
tinuously questioned by opposing powers; because of this, other interpretations
always remain possible.
Nietzsche’s homogenization of reality as will to power has different impli-
cations. First, “will” and “power” cannot refer to two different magnitudes; oth-
erwise reality would be understood from two principles rather than one. “Will”
and “power” entail the same quality. In Nietzsche’s notebooks, will to power is
further stipulated as commanding. Nietzsche states that “the only force there is,
is of the same type as willing: a commanding” (KSA 11:40[42]). By showing
that in both will and power the intrinsic active force is commanding, one can
make clear that “will” and “power” have the same extension.
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That power should be understood as commanding has already been explained
above: power has meaning only insofar as it is understood as subduing or over-
coming another power. How then should we understand “will” in “will to
power”? In contrast to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche does not view will as substantial
cause. Rather, he asserts, “[w]illing seems to be above all something complex.
Something that is a unity only as a word” (BGE 19; cf. KSA 7:19[132]). What
Schopenhauer conceives to be an act of the will is in reality, according to
Nietzsche, the result of such a fine mechanism that it almost escapes the eye of
the observer (see GS 127). Nietzsche specifies that hidden mechanism as a game
of forces (see KSA 11:25[185]), which also constitutes our inner world. Willing
is an outcome or an expression of this game of forces: somebody who wants
something commands something outside or inside him- or herself that obeys or
that he or she thinks obeys. Willing is an affect of commanding: “striving is
nothing else than striving for power” (KSA 13:14[82]).
Commanding is essential in both the concept of power and the concept of
will. The “to power” does not add a separate element to the concept of will but,
rather, accentuates an essential feature of it, namely, the always-being-on-the-
way toward subduing another will. “Will” and “power” presuppose and imply
each other. “Will to power” is one word.4
A question that emerges here is whether obeying, the antonym of command-
ing, should be taken as a separate quality. That such is not the case is already
implied by the inherent relationality of the will to power. Identifying a power
quantum as commanding or as obeying depends on which relations are taken into
account: in its relation to a weaker power quantum it is commanding, whereas,
at the same time, in its relation to a stronger power quantum it is obeying.
Another and probably a stronger argument against the conception that obey-
ing is a separate quality is that obeying cannot be taken as a fundamental drive,
motive, or “ground” of existence. For Nietzsche the “ground” of all living is
activity; obeying is something secondary, an effect or result of that primary
quality.5 That a will to power is subdued by another will to power is, in other
words, not something that lies in its nature but, rather, is the result of their inter-
action (see KSA 13:14[79]). Both are intrinsically inclined to command, but the
stronger subdues the weaker. Moreover, “submitting yourself” can, according
to Nietzsche, sometimes also be a strategic move.6 This also expresses that the
desire to command is the only primary motive. The same applies to another form
of reactivity, which Nietzsche condemns frequently, namely, adaptation.
According to him, “[L]ife is not adaptation of inner to outer conditions, but will
to power, which from within subordinates and incorporates ever more of the
‘external’” (KSA 12:7[9]).
This does not change the fact that “hierarchical order,” an order of com-
manding and obeying, has cardinal importance in Nietzsche’s doctrine of the
will to power. Hierarchical order is the result of an interaction between wills to
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power, which is accompained by reciprocal assessment (cf.KSA 11:25[426]).
According to Nietzsche, we have to attribute to all force a kind of intelligence,
which he denotes as a preconscious “recognizing and inferring” (KSA
9:10[F101]). This recognizing and inferring involves reciprocally assessing
or judging wills to power on the basis of strength, whereupon “decisions” are
made to subdue or be subdued. This is no passive exploring, but rather involves
immediate action. Recognizing and inferring is a unified process in which both
elements are executed at the same time. These elements cannot be expressions
of two different qualities; there is only one quality, one motive: the desire to
overpower.
A second implication of Nietzsche’s homogenization of reality is that there
is no fundamental difference between the organic and the inorganic: “the will
to power [. . .] also dictates the inorganic world, or rather, [. . .] there is no
inorganic world” (KSA 11:34[247]; cf. KSA 11:26[274], 11:36[21]). The
notion of recognizing and inferring presupposes that all forces are similar;
otherwise recognizing and inferring would not be possible.
The result of the reciprocal judging, accompanied by processes of submission,
is a hierarchical order that manifests itself in different forms of reality. All real-
ity is the result of these processes of measuring and subduing, respectively, of a
continuously changing hierarchical order, of smaller and bigger coups (see KSA
13:14[81], 13:14[98]). Change can be the symptom of both the establishment of
a new hierarchical order (which I call “substantializing”) and the collapse of an
old order (which I call “de-substantializing”). One should continuously keep in
mind here that all these processes—measuring, order, (de)substantializing, and
the rise and fall of different forms of reality that accompany them—have no real-
ity beside or outside the will to power. They are all manifestations of it. Will to
power individualizes itself in different appearances.7 Nietzsche’s ontology aims
to clarify how the processes of individuation proceed—that is, how a variable
and relational multiplicity arranges itself, decays, and rearranges itself in differ-
ent directions and in multifarious ways, how different functions and phenomena
form and decay, which we can see in Nietzsche’s conception of organization.
2. Organization
Nietzsche’s interest in the concept of organization and its relation to the notion
of the will to power has not received enough attention in the literature, particu-
larly considering it can be found throughout all his work.8 In the texts leading
up to the beginning of 1880, the concept of organization has no (explicit)
ontological status, so I shall concentrate on Nietzsche’s work after Daybreak,
especially on the period from the second half of the 1880s, during which the
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concept of organization was related ever more strongly to the notion of the will
to power.
Nietzsche’s interest in organization is not surprising: if multiplicity, variability,
and relationality are essential constitutive aspects of reality, and if, as a result of
that, there are no pre-given forms, then a seemingly independent and durable unity,
that is, every perceivable form of reality, can only exist as a variable and relational
multiplicity that is held together in some way. In Nietzsche’s words: “All unity is
only as organization and interplay a unity” (KSA 12:2[87]). A variable and rela-
tional multiplicity that is kept together is an organization—that which keeps it
together is, according to Nietzsche, will to power.
Any instance of will to power as such cannot be a durable and independent
unity—it is always a variable and relational multiplicity held together, and
those wills to power exist only as a multiplicity of wills to power, and so on 
ad infinitum. There are no last unities that one ultimately bumps up against.
Speaking about “a will to power” is therefore always misleading. “All reality is
will to power” can be determined more accurately as “all reality is ‘will to power’
organizations.”9 And because “interaction” is dynamic in the strongest sense
of the word, “organization” should be understood not as a noun but as a verb;
organization is an activity. The variable and relational multiplicity has to be
organized continuously.
An important implication of the ontological status of the will to power is that
reality is always necessarily organized to some degree. Because in Nietzsche’s
cosmology there seems to be no place for creatio ex nihilo (see KSA 9:11[157],
9:11[213], 10:24[36]), organization is always reorganization. An absolute
disorganized reality is a contradictio in terminis. Organization is inherent to life
(KSA 10:7[174]).
A “will to power” organization can be characterized as a hierarchically struc-
tured multiplicity of “will to power” organizations that internally and externally
interact with each other continuously. The will to power is the ground of existence
of an organization, that is, that which constitutes and drives an organization. But
how does that work? How does a will to power organize?
Nietzsche attributes to force an internal world that he explains as a precon-
scious activity that arranges, classifies, attaches, ties together, and orders (KSA
9:11[264]), as an activity that brings about a synthesis (KSA 11:26[204]). In this
respect, Nietzsche also uses the phrases “incorporate,” “assimilate,” “making
the unequal equal,” “falsify,” “simplify,” “make up,” and “create” (KSA
11:25[505], 11:26[204]). Other phrases that are used with respect to the concept
of organization are “secrete,” “select” (KSA 11:25[356]); “acquire,” “reform,”
“cut off” (KSA 11:25[333]); “transform into function or functionary” (KSA
12:9[91], 12:9[98]); “sort,” “grow” (KSA 11:40[15]); “measure,” “establish a
hierarchical order” (KSA 11:25[426], 11:25[433]); “judge” (KSA 11:25[427],
11:40[7]); “regulate,” “discipline” (KSA 11:25[427]); “form reciprocally,”
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“compress,” “reduce” (KSA 11:26[94], 11:40[34]); “separate,” “cleave” (TI
“Skirmishes” 37); “obey,” “command” (KSA 11:27[19]); “coordinate,” “har-
monize” (KSA 13:14[117]); and “discharge” and “regulating explosions” (KSA
10:7[77], 10:7[81], 10:16[20]).
These aspects of the concept of organization can roughly be classified in the
following manner. Bound up with the concept of “will to power” itself are the
facts that (1) “will to power” organizations act on each other, and (2) this acting
is directed at gathering more power. “Will to power” organizations assess each
other, judge each other with the intention to subdue each other. A“will to power”
organization is subdued when it is converted into a function or functionary of
another “will to power” organization. Converting another into a function or func-
tionary is denoted in more general phrases such as “assimilate,” “acquire,” or
“incorporate.” The result of a successful conquest is that the conqueror becomes
stronger, that the conqueror grows. That is why Nietzsche can say: “[T]he higher
type is only possible by pressing a lower into a function” (KSA 12:2[76]).
The suppression of a “will to power” organization by another “will to power”
organization is accompanied by a hierarchical order: the suppressor commands;
the suppressed obeys. The conversion of the suppressed into a function or func-
tionary means that certain rules of behavior are imposed on him, that he is
disciplined.
The suppressing and converting into a function of a “will to power” organi-
zation do not go on without struggle. The “will to power” organization that is
being subdued resists, because every “will to power” organization is inherently
directed at subduing. It is by virtue of this directedness that a “will to power”
organization resists being assimilated. Subduing a “will to power” organization
requires making equal what is unequal. The “will to power” organization that
has to be subdued must be arranged and transformed in such a way that it fits in
with the organization of the ruler (see KSA 11:40[7], 13:14[186]). On the other
hand, the ruler must transform its organization in such a way that it is able to
accommodate the suppressed. That is why Nietzsche speaks of “reciprocal form-
ing.” How many concessions have to be made on each side depends on the
strength of the different “will to power” organizations. If the ruling “will to
power” organization is not able to organize what is assimilated, decline sets in
(see KSA 12:2[76], 12:9[151]).
Nietzsche describes different methods by which a subdued “will to power”
organization is transformed into a functional member of the ruling “will to
power” organization. To “order,” “classify,” “arrange,” “regulate,” “harmo-
nize,” and “coordinate”—these methods represent generally that converting a
subdued “will to power” organization is accompanied by (re)structuring. The
phrases “attach,” “tie together,” synthesize,” and “compress” represent more
specifically how that (re)structuring occurs. Separate, sometimes contrary ele-
ments must be bound together to form a new whole. How much violence is
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necessary for this conversion depends on the strength of the opposing “will to
power” organization. The stronger the opposed “will to power” organization,
the more drastic the measures that have to be taken. Elements that can in no
way be converted into the new unity are removed or at least made harmless.
To “select,” “reduce,” “simplify,” “separate,” “secrete,” “cleave,” and “ampu-
tate” are measures that express those processes.
Nietzsche sometimes denotes the different, more or less specified practices
categorized above in a stronger metaphorical sense as “falsify,” “make up,” or
“create” (see also KSA 11:25[333]). Incorporating—which is accompanied by
reforming, converting, and transforming into a function—implies that the “orig-
inal” place and meaning of the subdued “will to power” organization are mod-
ified. With respect to this “original” place and meaning, the modification can
be designated as “falsify” and “make up.” The phrase “create” is appropriate,
because the result of the (reciprocal) transformation is something new.
Applying Robert Mayer’s thesis of discharge, Nietzsche states that the
suppression of a weaker “will to power” organization by a stronger and the
(re)arrangement of the elements of the organization that go along with that do
not proceed gradually but abruptly.10 Nietzsche speaks about “regulating explo-
sions.” A condition for that is tensile force, which Nietzsche relates closely to
the will to power, as the following fragment shows: “‘Will to power’ / ‘tensile
force’ [Spannkraft] / ‘gathered and stored movement-tendency’ [aufgesammelte
und aufgespeicherte Bewegungstendenz]” (KSA 12:9[92]). A strong “will to
power” organization is characterized by abundant internal tension. A will to
power exists, as indicated earlier, only by virtue of its effect and its resistant. It
is the force that is released through the discharge of the tension by which a stronger
“will to power” organization overpowers a weaker “will to power” organization.
This overpowering is only possible if a “will to power” organization possesses
more force than it needs to organize itself, that is, to persist (see KSA 10:7[95]).
In addition to the force that is needed to manage its own organization, there has
to be enough force to incorporate the “will to power” organization that has to be
subdued. As force must be essentially understood as the directedness at subdu-
ing, and as subduing requires a surplus of force, “real force” is by definition a
surplus of force (see TI “P” 1).
There is a great inclination here to identify Nietzsche’s concept of tensile force
with the Aristotelian dynamis, all the more because Nietzsche himself relates
both terms to each other, referring, in the text cited above, to Otto Liebman.11
He comments: “Lieb<mann> p. 11 / Dynamis ‘real tendency to action, still
restrained, which tries to actualize itself’” (KSA 12:9[92]). The differences
between Aristotle’s dynamis and Nietzsche’s tensile force, however, are very
great. First of all, Nietzsche repudiates the Aristotelian teleological framework.
The direction of the discharge is for him not pre-given. It does not, in other
words, lie in the individual nature of things but, rather, is the result of the relations
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among the different constellations of force. The only motive is the desire for
more power, and every end is only a means for that. Heidegger neglects this
great difference when he identifies the will to power with the Aristotelian con-
cepts dynamis, energeia, and entelecheia.12 From the “organization model” one
can add to this that the tension is the result of a multiplicity of “will to power”
organizations, which, all directed at commanding, keep each other in a certain
equilibrium. Therefore tensile force cannot be understood as a second predom-
inant quality beside commanding. Tensile force is derivative in respect to the
will to rule and can be conceived as a “means” for that or, better, as a modus of
that. Discharge in a certain direction is, as indicated earlier, the result of an
unthinkably complex interaction among an infinite number of “will to power”
organizations. These are organized in such a way by the ruling “will to power”
organization that they simultaneously release their internal tension on the
intended opposing organization. And it is this order, which is necessary in order
to have, in a sense, all noses pointing in the same direction, that creates the
“illusion” of finality (see KSA 12:9[91]; GM III:18).13
At this point it is important to guard against possible misunderstandings. The
account presented above is potentially misleading to the extent that, like Nietzsche
himself at times, it suggests that (1) conscious decisions are made, (2) the activ-
ities described above can be separated from the striving for more power, and (3)
the interaction is between only two “will to power” organizations. The different
activities described above are not provoked by conscious decisions but, in fact,
proceed with necessity and are preconscious. They are further differentiations and
elaborations of the internal world of force, the will to power, which earlier was
also determined as “preconscious recognizing and inferring” or “judging.” That
we are dealing with living and intelligent activities here must not mislead us into
qualifying them as conscious. The activities of assimilation, selection, secretion,
and so forth that are commonly attributed to the mind are, according to Nietzsche,
in reality the essential functions of all organic life. Furthermore, all mental
processes are in reality primarily characterized by these activities. By calling these
activities “organic,” Nietzsche does not want to reserve them only for the organic
world, as distinguished from the inorganic.14 He accentuates with this designa-
tion their preconscious and necessary character. These processes essentially
characterize all reality.15
Because only one active quality can be adopted, all activities described above
are manifestations of the will to power.16 Which manifestations the will to power
takes on depends on the context, that is, the continuously changing power rela-
tions. One situation calls for attachment; the other, for secretion; yet another,
for compressing; and so on. Nietzsche conceives not only growth but also decay
as a striving for more power. The detachment in two separate “will to power”
organizations, for example, can be the result of not being able to manage what
is incorporated but is at the same time driven by a will “not to let go of what is
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conquered” (KSA 12:9[151]; cf. KSA 12:5[64], 12:6[26]). One could say that all
differentiated activities—and even detachment is an activity—are means for
gaining more power, but then only on the condition that “means” and “end”
cannot be separated from each other; the will to power is not a fixed end but,
rather, an active directedness.
The conception that interaction occurs between only two “will to power”
organizations is a simplification. One could say that in reality there is an infi-
nite number of “will to power” organizations that interact with each other—but
then again, only under certain conditions. First of all, as noted above, one should
keep in mind that there are no last unities against which one ultimately bumps.
Every “will to power” organization is in reality, as indicated earlier, a constitu-
tion of a multiplicity of “will to power” organizations, and so ad infinitum. In
addition, “will to power” organizations not only compose one another but also
overlap, both internally and externally.
A comparison with social systems can clarify this. An individual can be part of
a family. A family can then be part of a village. And a village can in turn be part
of a state. The whole family or a part of it, however, can at the same time be part
of a school or church. And the church can then be part of an international religious
institute. But even the individual in this example cannot be a final unit; the indi-
vidual consists, among other things, of organs (but also drives and thoughts), which
then consist of different kinds of biological and chemical components, and so
forth. This comparison also makes clear that the boundaries of an organization are
not fixed but, rather, depend on which elements and relations one focuses on.
The model of the family also illustrates the inherent relationality of the will
to power. A father is only a father in relation to his son, and vice versa. And a
family only has meaning insofar as it refers to a father and/or mother and/or
child. The different “will to power” organizations do not exist independently of
one another; they are what they are by virtue of their mutual relations.17
Moreover, these relations are dynamic in the strongest sense of the word.
Because a “will to power” organization exists only by virtue of its effect and its
resistant, interaction is essential. And because every “will to power” organiza-
tion is constituted by a multiplicity of “will to power” organizations, interaction
takes place both “internally” and “externally.” What is denoted as “internal” or
“external” is relative to one’s object of focus. In Nietzsche’s conception of reality
everything is connected with everything, and every interaction, internal or exter-
nal, necessarily affects every other interaction (see KSA 11:27[19]). These internal
and external interactions, which are in their turn manifestations of an infinite
complex of processes of subduing, lie at the basis of all change and development.
These processes cannot and should not be understood phenomenally (see KSA
13:14[79]). Because spatiotemporal determinations, in which we necessarily think
in terms of (the changing of) things, are themselves also symptoms of interactions
among “will to power” organizations, those interactions can never be made an
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object of the mind. Even a conception or mental image is an expression of a power
seizure.
This irreducible and incomprehensible status of interactions is expressed by
Nietzsche’s characterization of the will to power as pathos (see KSA 13:14[79]).
The expression that we are slaves of our passions expresses to some extent the
status of the will to power (see KSA 12:2[151]). The concept “passion,” which
also means suffering, reflects the directedness of the will to power toward resist-
ances.18 The pre-phenomenal status of the interaction among “will to power”
organizations is another reason why the elaboration of Nietzsche’s organization
model is (necessarily) artificial: it is, in other words, the result of abstraction.
If all reality is continuous interaction among “will to power” organizations, how
then is it possible that we seem to perceive durability? And if that interaction has
no teleological character, how then is it possible that we seem to find regularity
in the world? The organization model discussed above already gives us some indi-
cations of how to explain (the “fiction” of) stability.19 Working out an important
aspect of this model in the next section will shed more light on this issue.
3. Form
In a note from winter 1883–84, Nietzsche writes that it is intrinsic to every force
that it offers resistance toward all other forces, assesses all other forces with the
intention to incorporate them or cut them off, and arranges or converts all other
forces according to a certain “form and rhythm” (KSA 10:24[14]).20 Stability is
the result of ordering “will to power” organizations in different ways according
to a certain form and rhythm. This view distinguishes Nietzsche not only from
the traditional-substantialist way of thinking but also from modern physics,
because for him even the laws of nature are nothing other than an “establish-
ment of power relations” (KSA 11:39[13]), that is, effects of the acting of “will
to power” organizations on one another on the basis of a recurring form.
We find only a few indications in Nietzsche about how we should understand
the status of that form. It is clear that it has a naturalistic basis. In a notebook text
Nietzsche states that organic entities possess a kind of thinking that reproduces
incorporated forms. Not all incorporated forms are reproduced. Nietzsche empha-
sizes repeatedly that the oldest incorporated forms are the strongest. The
tendency to copy those is the strongest, and they form, in a certain sense, the
backbone of the ordering of our world (see KSA 11:39[12]). Moreover, this repro-
duction is not precise. Only the ground forms (Grundformen) are reproduced;
details are left out (see KSA 11:40[34], 11.645 f.). We have here a certain type 
of filter that simplifies and equalizes the multiplicity of impressions in such 
a way that we think each time that we perceive the same thing (KSA 11:26[94],
11:41[11]).21
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Nietzsche denotes the reproduction of ground forms as an internal process,
as an activity that engenders structure in the multiplicity, that organizes it accord-
ing to the longest incorporated ground forms (see KSA 11:26[94]). It is clear that
the activity is the will to power. The activity of the will to power lies at the basis
of all thinking.22 Knowing is nothing else than organizing a multiplicity of new
impulses according to a certain incorporated ground form. Ground forms are
prejudgments (Vor-urtheile) of the mind.
How does a form arise? A form arises when a part of a “will to power” organ-
ization, which itself is constituted by a multiplicity of organizations, detaches itself
from its original place and carries on relatively independently. Whether it is able
to do that depends on its power to organize itself in such a way that a clear inter-
nal hierarchical order is established. Realizing this, however, always requires the
submission of certain “will to power” organizations and a tearing away from oth-
ers. Subdued “will to power” organizations must be arranged in such a way that
they work for the ruling organization. When a clear internal hierarchical order is
missing or there is an internal power equilibrium, the organization falls apart into
two or more “unities.” If the organization is not able to offer enough resistance to
external organizations, it runs the risk of being incorporated (see KSA 11:26[274]).
Because everything is in continuous change—everything acts incessantly on
everything—hierarchical organization is something that occurs continuously.
Organization is, as I said earlier, a verb. That is probably why Nietzsche speaks
about organizing according to a certain form and rhythm. A certain hierarchical
order occurs in imposing a certain regularity on the subdued wills to power. This
imposed regularity is also responsible for the “illusion” of finality. If a “will to
power” organization is able to maintain a certain hierarchical order for a long
time, the “illusions” of durability, unity, and independence emerge. One then
believes that a certain form is substantial. If this belief becomes so strong that
it is no longer questioned, a ground form is established, forming the basis for
what we hold to be reality and truth.
Ground forms have a pragmatic-naturalistic basis. The declaration of certain
forms as unconditional truth and their incorporation make up a life-ensuring
necessity rather than a free choice.23 An organization maintains itself only inso-
far as it fixates itself continuously in a certain way, according to a certain form
and rhythm. Life is possible only by virtue of substantializing, which always
means falsifying, that is, making equal what is not equal. Truths or incorporated
forms are life-ensuring “fictions.” They protect a certain kind of life from resolv-
ing into a variable multiplicity. The forms that have proved themselves to be life
ensuring are incorporated. The determination of which forms are life ensuring
depends on the context, which continuously changes.
The preservation of a certain kind of life according to a certain form is always
only a “means” with which the will to power can reinforce itself; it is never an
end. Ultimately, it is nothing else than the effect of a striving for more power of a
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certain “will to power” organization.24 The will to power “needs the contraction
of the perspective, the egoism, as a temporary condition for existence; it looks
from each level up to a higher” (KSA 11:35[68]; cf. KSA 12:2[90]). Which forms
are life ensuring depends on the internal and external power constellations. The
will to power assesses which forms are most favorable for the preservation of a
certain kind of life. We have to keep in mind here that the will to power is not a
substance, even if my formulation sometimes suggests that. Again, the only qual-
ity that exists is the striving for more power. Consequently, it is by virtue of this
striving that a certain kind of life is preserved—overpowering is, therefore, a con-
dition for (“self”-)preservation.
Insofar as ground forms, which constitute certain truths, fulfill a pragmatic-
naturalistic function and stimulate the constitution and growth of new and
stronger “will to power” organizations, Nietzsche does not value them
negatively. On the contrary, they are, as we have seen, of vital importance. The
problem, however, is that ground forms remain operative even after they cease
to fulfill that function. In a physiological context Nietzsche states: “[E]very drive
is bred as a temporary condition for existence. It is inherited, even long after it
has ceased to be that” (KSA 11:26[72]). The danger Nietzsche is warning against
is the preservation of ground forms that are no longer life ensuring. Ground
forms can also obstruct the constitution and growth of new and stronger “will
to power” organizations. How exactly they do this, and how those obstructions
can be overcome, will be discussed in the next section, which deals with the
notion of struggle and its relation to organization.
4. Organization and Struggle
That the notion of the will to power already entails the concept of struggle
(Kampf, Streit) can be easily shown. The will to power is, as we have seen repeat-
edly, essentially directed at subduing as many other wills to power as possible.
All other wills to power, however, are also directed at that (see KSA 11:26[276],
11:36[22], 11:40[55], 13:14[186]). A consequence of this is that the interaction
among wills to power is characterized by struggle. That the will to power only
exists by virtue of its actions and its resistances, as we saw earlier, means that
it only is by virtue of struggle. And as everything that happens is will to power,
Nietzsche claims: “All happening [Geschehen] is struggle . . .” (KSA 12:1[92];
cf. KSA 12:9[91]). That is not to say that all reality is based on struggle or all
reality is determined by struggle. Such interpretations already assume that strug-
gle is an additional quality of something that distinguishes itself from it. Struggle,
however, is a constitutive relation, not an additional and distinct element.
Earlier sections of this article established that Nietzsche conceives
organization as inherent in all reality. Reality is such by virtue of both struggle
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and organization. How should we understand the relation between these two
concepts? Clarifying this relation will also shed light on the important differ-
ence that Nietzsche makes between strong or healthy and weak or sick “will to
power” organizations.
A “will to power” organization overpowers, as we saw earlier, another “will
to power” organization by the force that is released through the discharge of its
internal tension. Internal tension is generated by building up the internal strug-
gle in an organization. Internal struggle is therefore a necessary condition for
becoming stronger. At the same time, however, that tension can only be built up
if the opposing parties are related to each other in a certain way; if, in other
words, the struggle is organized. Moreover, overpowering is only possible if the
internal struggle is organized in such a way that the tension can be discharged
at the same time and in the same direction. The hierarchical ordering that is
required for that produces, as indicated before, the “illusion” that reality has a
teleological character.25
Thus, on the one hand, the internal struggle in an organization has to be
increased and intensified to such a degree that enough internal force is gener-
ated. On the other hand and at the same time, however, this internal struggle has
to be organized in such a way that the organization does not fall apart and that
the discharge has a certain direction (see KSA 12:9[92]).26
We can now return to the concept of ground forms. Ground forms are mani-
festations of “will to power” organizations that are ordered in such a way that
subduing other organizations is possible. These are incorporated because they
have proven themselves to be “means” that can preserve a certain kind of life,
on the basis of which a “will to power” organization can become stronger.
Ground forms can, however, as indicated above, also obstruct the constitution
and growth of new and stronger “will to power” organizations. That happens
when they are given an unconditional status. One then “forgets” that they are
for the use of “will to power” organizations to become stronger. The effect of
declaring a certain ground form unconditional is that the struggle between and
within “will to power” organizations is destroyed. Other ground forms, which
are manifestations of other “will to power” organizations, do not get a chance
to develop themselves. Struggle is, as we have seen, indispensable for generat-
ing tension. A “will to power” organization overpowers another organization
with the force that is released through the discharge of tension. Without strug-
gle, a “will to power” organization cannot become stronger. That is why
Nietzsche campaigns against every type of unconditionality: “the world of the
unconditional, if it existed, would be the unproductive. But one must finally
understand that existent and unconditional are contradictory predicates” (KSA
11:26[203]).
How can one prevent a certain ground form from being given an uncondi-
tional status or fight against it? Nietzsche’s answer to this question is, as
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expected, by promoting and increasing struggle. Only the continuation and
intensification of the struggle among a multiplicity of “will to power” organi-
zations can guard against disintegration. Therefore he states: “There has to be
struggle for the sake of struggle” (KSA 11:26[276]); “[t]he struggle [. . .] becomes
a regulating principle” (KSA 10:7[190]). A certain ground form, which is a
manifestation of a certain “will to power” organization, can only be questioned
if other “will to power” organizations are strong enough to do that. That means
that a “will to power” organization has to seek out as many rivals as possible
and has to strive for as much internal struggle and dividedness as possible. Only
then is growth possible.
However, we have to be careful here: we must take into account that Nietzsche
often emphasizes the importance of struggle, because he believes that in his (our)
culture, Platonic metaphysics and Christian morality have organized life in a
uniform way to such a degree that every possible counteraction is destroyed.
That does not mean that Nietzsche gives less importance to the element of organ-
ization. In some of his thoughts on the possibility of a future Europe, for example,
which is an issue that is relevant today more than ever, he emphasizes the element
of organization, because in that case he finds tremendous struggle and division
but no organizing force (see BGE 208, 256).27 Moreover, life-forms that have
declared themselves absolute can only be effectively challenged if the opponent
is well organized. Although struggle is indispensable for generating continuous
growth, it is able to do that only if the different struggling parties remain, at the
same time, related to each other. Only then are “will to power” organizations
able to subdue other “will to power” organizations, to become stronger, and to
guard themselves against disintegration.
The “organization–struggle” model that is developed suggests that Nietzsche
has more nuanced notions of “strong” and “weak.” Only the combination of
strong organization and intense struggle is a trait of strength and health. If a
high degree of organization is achieved by excluding all struggle, that is a sign
of weakness. And also intense struggle without great organizational force is a
sign of weakness. A strong or healthy “will to power” organization is charac-
terized by considerable divergence and struggle that is forced into a unity in a
structured manner. A kind of discrepancy or instability, or chaos, as Nietzsche
sometimes calls it, is therefore inherent in the strong type.28 That is why the
strongest organisms can be the most vulnerable: the more internal struggle an
organization contains, the more difficult it is to maintain a unity and the bigger
the chance that it will fall apart. Weak or sick “will to power” organizations, in
contrast, which contain little divergence and struggle, can be more easily organ-
ized and have less chance of falling apart. They are more stable than strong
organizations.29 That, however, does not alter the fact that the weak type is
unfruitful and in the long run liable to a process of disintegration. But even dis-
integration is, as we have seen, driven by the quest for more power or is the
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result of submission to the offensives of other “will to power” organizations.
This refinement of what Nietzsche conceives as a strong or healthy type obvi-
ously makes quite untenable the view that the notion of the will to power implies
brutal, bodily force. Concepts such as “dynamic,” “growth,” and “richness” are
more compatible with this notion.
5. A Test Case: Decadence
The organization–struggle model provides a more nuanced view of Nietzsche’s
conception that all reality is will to power and of his concept of the strong or
healthy type. It also sheds light on other complex concepts of Nietzsche’s
philosophy. As a kind of “test case” I want to discuss one of those difficult con-
cepts, namely, “decadence.”
Müller-Lauter explains in his Nietzsche that the weak or decadent is a type of
will to power that is unable to organize the conflicting variance within itself.30
In another article he defines decadence as the “[i]ncapacity for organic forma-
tion,” a physiological deficiency of organizing force, which manifests itself as
the process of a part becoming independent with respect to the whole.31 Adegen-
erating will to power has, according to Müller-Lauter, still enough unity to strive
for disintegration in striving for nothingness. Avenging its impotence to organ-
ize itself, the weak negates itself—and with that, reality as will to power—with
the help of a fabricated, “true” reality.32 Nietzsche’s remedy for decadence is,
according to Müller-Lauter, to acknowledge that reality is will to power.33
A difficult question that arises in this respect is, How is decadence at all
possible? How can we explain that the weak is no longer able to organize the
conflicting variance within itself? How can a part detach itself from the whole?
How can a degenerating will to power will to fall apart? How can the will to
power negate itself—and not acknowledge itself? How can life, of which the
will to power is the principle, turn against itself?
Building on Nietzsche’s method of the “principle of economy,” I think that
the answer to these questions must be sought in the structure of the will to power
itself. If the will to power is the only quality and the only principle of interpre-
tation, then decadence too must be explicable in its terms. Decay must be expli-
cable from the striving for growth. Weakness must be comprehensible in terms
of the principle of strength. Passivity must be clarified from the principle of
activity. Sickness must be explained from the principle of health. Death, as the
most extreme type of decay, must be bound up with the quality of life. But how
can we understand all of this?
Müller-Lauter’s work offers some direction. He states, for example, that the
turning point from diagnosis to treatment lies in the discovery that sickness itself
bears the character of the will to power.34 But how that is possible is not
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elaborated systematically from the principle of the will to power itself. The
organization–struggle model that I have developed is more informative, and
because I have demonstrated that all elements of this model can be “reduced”
to the will to power, its usage is justified.
In my model the possibility of decadence can be explained from two perspec-
tives, which are (necessarily) connected. The first explanation is that decadence
is bound up with the structure of organization. A “will to power” organization
can become stronger only if it is able to organize the multiplicity of wills to power
in itself according to a certain form. It must impose a certain identity on itself.
The imposition of a form on itself is necessarily accompanied by a weakening or
restraining of the internal struggle. However, that internal struggle is , at the same
time, necessary for growth. Organization is necessary for gathering more power,
but it contains at the same time the danger of decadence.
This danger can be elaborated by clarifying how decadence is bound up with
the structure of a ground form insofar as it functions as life ensuring and life
enhancing. An important function of a ground form is to regulate the chaos of
impressions, that is, the impact of other “will to power” organizations; a ground
form enables a “will to power” organization to defend itself against those influ-
ences so that it does not fall apart. Regulation occurs by “the arranging of the
new material on the old patterns (= Procrustes-bed), a making equal of the new”
(KSA 11:41[11]). This type of inertia can be life ensuring or even life enhanc-
ing to a certain degree. It gives a certain “will to power” organization time to
structure itself and prepare for the next attack. However, the power constella-
tions can at a certain moment have changed so much that maintaining a certain
ground form becomes counterproductive. The inertia inherent in ground forms
can inhibit the “perception” of this (in time to do something about it). Thus, that
a “will to power” organization is not able to reorganize itself on time, that is, to
impose on itself a different form, is caused by the inertia, the life-ensuring
equalizer and negationist of what is new, that is inherent in ground forms.
Decadence can also be the result of the success of a certain ground form. A
certain ground form can be so successful in its submission of opposing “will to
power” organizations that it destroys all internal and external struggle. Because
a “will to power” organization only exists and grows by virtue of struggle, exces-
sive success has disintegrating consequences in the long run. The structure of
form contains both growth and decay.
The second explanation is that decadence is internal to the dynamic character
of struggle. Internal struggle is a condition for a “will to power” organization to
become strong. When, however, the internal struggle cannot be organized in
such a way that tension is generated that can be discharged in a certain direc-
tion, decline occurs. Struggle is necessary for gathering more power, but it
contains at the same time the danger of decadence. The greater the struggle, the
more difficult it is to organize it and the greater the chance of decay.
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The result of applying the organization–struggle model to the problem of
decadence, the explanation that this model offers for how decadence is possi-
ble, is exemplary for its degree of usability. Apart from the question of whether
this model is logically consistent, what is crucial is whether it proves to be fruitful
in the explanation of (Nietzschean) problems, including how we might under-
stand truth in Nietzsche’s philosophy, or what his conception of freedom is, or
what the idea of the Übermensch entails. At the same time the result of applying
this model to different problems can be used to develop it further and to adjust
or improve the model itself.
6. Closing: Results and Problems
Heidegger’s work continues to have an enormous influence on how Nietzsche’s
notion of the will to power is interpreted. In this study I have tried to show that,
in contrast to Heidegger’s assertion, the will to power is not a traditional meta-
physical unity.35 The will to power is not a substance but, rather, the “principle”
with which Nietzsche tries to deconstruct substance thinking. Heidegger’s
insight that “power” and “will” should not be detached from each other is
correct.36 He is right to insist that “power” in “will to power” must not be under-
stood as an external end or purpose of the will. “Will to power” should be
conceived as will-to-more-power, as commanding.37 I also have argued that
“power” and “will” are not two separate qualities and that power is a necessary
striving for more power. On my account, however, in contrast to Heidegger’s,
this structure of power implies precisely that the will to power does not possess
a substantial, durable character. The conception that power is always will to
power and that will is always will to power implies that the will to power is a
kind of directedness without a beginning in a primary cause or an end in a final
goal.38 The will to power refers to acting or doing (Tun) without there being
something (durable) that acts or strives (Täter). A will to power that does not
act, a nonactive will to power, is a contradictio in adjecto; an active will to power
is a pleonasm.
Heidegger’s thesis that commanding should be understood primarily as com-
manding oneself, as self-overcoming, is also very reasonable.39 But here too
there is an important difference between his interpretation and mine. Heidegger
conceives the will to power as a metaphysical unity because he does not
recognize the internal divergence in the structure of the will to power as self-
commanding. On my account, “self-commanding” and “self-overcoming” mean
being able to organize the multiplicity of wills to power, such that the struggle
is not weakened or destroyed but, rather, intensified; growth, the submission
and incorporation of other wills to power, can only be realized through the force
that is released through the discharge of tension, which in its turn is generated
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through the internal struggle. A “willing person” does not command him- or
herself (for how would we able to comprehend that?) but, rather, commands
something in him- or herself.40 The “self” is only a “unity” as organization.
Heidegger’s fixation on the will to power as the fundamental principle of tradi-
tional metaphysics prevents him from recognizing its special character. Despite
his acknowledgment that the will to power is essentially Übermächtigung, he
opposes it to becoming and conceives it as the principle that “freezes” becoming.41
In contrast, I have tried to show that Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power implies
a monism in which even being is conceived as becoming. Because the will to power
exists only by virtue of its effects and its resistances, it implies variability, multi-
plicity, and relationality. As demonstrated repeatedly, “effect” is always effect on
other wills to power; power is power only insofar as it can preserve itself against
other wills to power and is directed at subduing them. Although the will to power
is the organizing “principle” of becoming and imposes a certain form on it, this
organizing or substantializing itself can exist only as a becoming. Being is not
something that is opposed to becoming, but becoming includes being. Being is, in
this sense, deconstructed into becoming, that is, as an organizing of the variable
and relational multiplicity of struggling “will to power” organizations according
to a certain form. This substantializing, imposing a type of being on becoming, is
not something that distinguishes itself from becoming. It describes the character
of becoming; becoming is nothing else than processes of substantializing.
To sum up, Nietzsche’s perspective does justice to different important aspects
of reality. The organization–struggle model shows that, in contrast to Aristotle’s
teleological model, the direction of the development of reality is not pre-given,
which guarantees the possibility of fundamental novelty and radical change; the
world is, in a sense, continuously pregnant with a measureless variety and
multiplicity of possibilities that are still unknown to us. This model also does
justice to the dynamic connectedness of the world: the notion of struggle indi-
cates that a thing exists only by virtue of its actions and its resistances, which
implies that interactions do not occur between preexisting things but, rather, that
interacting “things” come to be what they are by virtue of interactions. Moreover,
that Nietzsche’s worldview is dynamic in the strongest sense of the word does
not imply that there is no regularity operative in the world: as we have seen, if
a “will to power” organization is able to maintain a certain hierarchical order
for a long time, the “illusions” of durability, unity, and independence emerge; a
certain ground form then is established, which forms the basis for what we hold
to be reality and truth.
The model developed in this text shows that both organization and struggle
are crucially important for adequately understanding Nietzsche’s notion that all
reality is will to power. Although the concept of “struggle” is receiving growing
attention in the Nietzsche literature, mainly under the influence of Müller-
Lauter’s work, the importance of the concept of “organization” is still virtually
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unnoticed. The concept of “organization” is, as I have tried to show here, no less
important in Nietzsche’s worldview than that of “struggle.”
Two final thoughts serve as my conclusion. Although the organization–struggle
model gives us some grip on how we should understand Nietzsche’s dynamic
worldview, it still has to be clarified further how something like radical change
is possible, how exactly, from Nietzsche’s point of view, something novel can
occur. Taking into account that Nietzsche seems to repudiate creatio ex nihilo,
adopting a certain kind of potentiality seems unavoidable. Although Nietzsche
gives us notions such as “tensile force,” “chaos,” and “chance,” which all shed
some light on the phenomenon of potentiality, more systematic analyses of how
those (and other related) concepts relate to each other and how they could
provide us with a non-Aristotelian notion of potentiality are needed. Only then
would we be able to better understand the relation between potentiality and
actuality, that is, how something that is not present can nevertheless actualize
itself and emerge in “the world.”
The second point concerns the possibility of an ethics in Nietzsche’s world-
view. Nietzsche seems to derive an ethical norm or standard of evaluation from
the notion of a strong or healthy “will to power” organization, itself conceived
in terms of the only ontological quality he recognizes: directedness at more
power. The criterion for what makes for a strong or healthy organization cannot
be external, because besides the will to power, there is no other quality or prin-
ciple. A“will to power” organization is strong or healthy insofar as it does justice
to its nature or essence, which is the directedness at more power. From the degree
of internal and external struggle and the way it is organized, one can make out
to what extent that quality has been met. So if the characterizations “strong” and
“weak” can be understood as value judgments (strong is good; weak is bad),
Nietzsche seems to found ethics on ontology: something is good insofar as it
coincides with its “essence,” which is the will to (over)power.42 In addition, the
tenor throughout Nietzsche’s texts is that the strong type is an ideal that should
be pursued: you must become what you (really) are.
This view confronts us with great difficulties: if, first of all, the strong type
is an ideal that should be pursued, how then could we realize it? How can you
strive, on the one hand, for maximum struggle and dividedness and, on the other
hand and at the same time, for maximum relatedness and unity?43 This seems
to be a difficult task to fulfill, maybe even a mission impossible. Second, the
idea of the strong as an ideal that can be pursued seems to be incompatible with
Nietzsche’s notion of reality as will to power. An implication of Nietzsche’s
homogenization of reality as will to power seems to be that we cannot ask why
a certain “will to power” organization is strong or weak, what causes this. There
is besides the will to power no other quality or (external) cause that could serve
as an explanation. Nietzsche writes in a note from the late Nachlass “that some-
thing is as it is, so strong, so weak, that is not the result of obeying, or of a rule,
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or of a compulsion . . .” (KSA 13:14[79]; cf. KSA 12:2[139]). Something is, it
appears, simply what it is. Nietzsche’s homogenized reality seems to be imma-
nent and endogenous through and through. But if something is just (necessarily?)
what it is, then every form of self-control is in vain.44 And without the possi-
bility of self-control, pursuing ideals is a hopeless enterprise. If, on the other
hand, it is not possible to understand the strong type as an ideal that can be
pursued, and this is the last point I want to raise, then the question arises as to
whether, and in what sense, a Nietzschean ethics is possible at all. Could a further
development and sophistication of the organization–struggle model contribute
to a better understanding of these problems?
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NOTES
1. Nietzsche writes, “No substance, rather something that strives for reinforcement; and
which wants to ‘preserve’ itself only indirectly (it wants to overbid [überbieten] itself)” (KSA
12:9[98]; cf. GS 349); “[t]he actual purpose of Spinoza’s statement of self-preservation is to
terminate change” (KSA 13:14[121]).
2. See also P. van Tongeren, Die Moral von Nietzsches Moralkritik (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag,
1989), 174–77.
3. See C. Aydin, “Chaos,” in Nietzsche-Wörterbuch, vol. 1, ed. P. J. M. van Tongeren, G.
Schank, H. W. Siemens, and the Nietzsche Research Group (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2004), 449–68.
4. See also V. Gerhardt’s attempt to show this: “Wo Macht ist, muß auch Wille sein, der
selbst, von dieser Macht ausgehend, zu größerer Macht strebt, die wiederun nur im Verbindung
mit einem über sie hinausgehenden Willen vorgestellt werden kann” (Vom Willen zur Macht.
Anthropologie und Metaphysik der Macht am exemplarischen Fall Friedrich Nietzsches [Berlin:
de Gruyter, 1996], 271).
5. For an excellent elaboration of the primacy of activity, see M. Brusotti, “Die
‘Selbstverkleinerung des Menschen’ in der Moderne: Studie zu Nietzsches Zur Genealogie der
Moral,” Nietzsche-Studien 21 (1992): 81–136.
6. Nietzsche writes, “One submits to the large, in order to subdue the small” (KSA 10:13[10];
cf. Z II: “Self-Overcoming”).
7. The similarities between Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power and Schopenhauer’s
concept of the will are sometimes difficult to ignore (KSA 11:34[247], 35[15], 35[60]). Although
there are parallels, the thinkers have fundamentally different views. Schopenhauer’s will is
ultimately an invariable and independent unity, a substance; Nietzsche’s will to power implies the
primacy of multiplicity, relationality, and variability. For Nietzsche every substance is exposed as
a variable and relational multiplicity of wills to power. And every substantializing, every
determination of reality, is exposed as an expression of a will to subdue, which is continuously
questioned by other wills to overpower. Above all, Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power wants
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to acknowledge the reality of becoming, do justice to it, and interpret it adequately. Schopenhauer,
in contrast, determines all becoming and all individuation as a delusion that we have to escape.
That is why becoming for him can never be the object of a genuine philosophy (see esp. A.
Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung [Cologne: Könemann, 1997], vol. 1, bk. 3, §53).
For Nietzsche individuation is no delusion but, rather, an authentic reality.
8. In the second of his Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche qualifies the modern Western
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